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Abstract 
The impact of sovereign credit downgrades on financial markets was deeply scrutinized on the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, especially in Southern Europe. The purpose of this thesis is to 
analyze the impact of sovereign credit rating downgrades both on National and Foreign stock 
markets through an Event-Study methodology. The main focus is the impact generated by S&P and 
Moody’s downgrades on market indexes from advanced economies throughout the world. This 
approach was taken to compare the impact felt by the downgraded countries with the impact on 
other countries belonging to that same region. Even though I find little evidence of national impact 
outside Europe, where the abnormal returns range from -0,03% to -0,2% on the event date, my 
analysis suggests that there is evidence of spillover effects throughout the developed world, as one 
of the models used finds significant negative abnormal returns on the event date in 2 out of the 3 
estimation windows considered, the third being marginally insignificant. Regardless of the model 
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Abstracto 
O impacto dos downgrades da dívida soberana nos mercados financeiros foi profundamente 
escrutinado depois da crise de 2008, especialmente no Sul da Europa. O propósito desta tese é 
analisar o impacto do downgrade do rating da dívida soberana nos mercados de acções nacionais e 
internacionais através da metodologia Event-Study. O foco principal é o impacto gerado por 
downgrades da S&P e da Moody’s nos índices de mercado de várias economias desenvolvidas. Esta 
abordagem foi seguida de modo a comparar o impacto sentido pelos países que sofreram um 
downgrade com o impacto gerado noutros países da região. Ainda que encontre poucas evidências 
de um impacto nacional fora da Europa, onde os retornos anormais variam entre -0,03% e -0,2% no 
dia do evento, a minha análise sugere que existem evidências de efeitos de spillover nas várias 
economias analisadas, dado que um dos modelos usados encontrou retornos anormais significantes 
em 2 das 3 janelas usadas, sendo que a 3ª foi marginalmente insignificante. Ignorando os modelos 
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On the 5th of July of 2011 Portugal’s long-term credit rating was downgraded to Ba2 in Moody’s 
rating scale, signaling that the country’s debt was not “Investment Grade” for the first time in the 
21st century. By the 5th of August, the Portuguese Stock Index (PSI20) had lost 15% of its initial 
value (on the 5th of July), in that same period the Italian FTMIB and the Spanish IBEX35 lost, 
respectively, 21% and 16% of their initial value, even though the national credit ratings stayed the 
same.  
O’Rourke (2002) shows that the relative weight of world exports on world GDP has increased 
from 5,5% to 17,2% between 1950 and 1998. He argues that such evolution is a consequence of the 
economic phenomenon known as Globalization, which Larsson (2001) defines as the increasing 
ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody 
on the other side of the world. Even though economists often focused on the benefits of increasing 
integration, with financial experts frequently emphasizing the benefits of international risk 
diversification (Wolf and Drezner (2005), McNicoll (2004)), the risks of growing integration were 
often overlooked until 2008. In this year the American sub-prime crisis, whose predictive signs had 
arisen in precedent years, instigated the freezing of the American Money Market, since lenders did 
not know the extent of the borrowers’ exposure to the housing market (Krishnamurthy (2010)). 
European financial institutions, especially banks, not only had some of their short term debt 
denominated in American dollars, which they were not able to rollover then, but a growing part of 
their investments were done in American mortgage related securities, which were losing value 
every day (Baba et al. (2009)). As such, the contagion effects from the downturn in the American 
economy were soon felt across Europe. In this climate of high risk-aversion, the sustainability of the 
large piles of sovereign debt accumulated by some European countries over the previous years were 
soon to be questioned.  
Credit ratings provide market participants with (new) information regarding the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan. In this period of uncertainty, the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, investors 
relied on the analysis of the rating agencies to better assess the credit worthiness of the most 
vulnerable countries. However, as will be presented in detail afterwards, a stylized fact concerning 
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likely to occur in economic expansions whereas downgrades are more likely to occur in periods of 
economic recession. In the case of firms such downgrades are felt in negative stock returns and 
increasing bond yields1. Downgrades of sovereign debt on the other hand have real effects on 
national stock markets: Brooks et al. (2004), Hooper et al. (2008), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) 
Mateev (2014) and Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks (2008) all find significant negative impacts 
on stock markets when the country’s rating is downgraded for example. Moreover, some studies 
such as Partnoy (1999) have challenged the premise that new information is conveyed to the 
market. If we combine these two ideas with the Home Bias hypothesis (national investors tend to 
invest more at home than they should), we can see the importance of such event for the country 
being downgraded. Even though, one must say, such hypothesis will be a barrier for the dispersion 
effects analyzed afterwards, as it will act as an insulation mechanism for the neighbor countries. 
An issue that has not been studied in detail is how stock market crashes originated by sovereign 
rating downgrades spill over into other stock markets. If, as some of the literature suggests, stock 
markets are contagion bridges across countries, (Forbes and Rigobon (1999), Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996)), then not only were the countries being negatively reviewed vulnerable, but other countries 
were potentially exposed as well. Such exposure was, in the case of Europe, amplified by the 
common currency, the Euro, since economic and financial shocks spread faster and stronger in 
currency unions (Rose and Engel (2000)). The case of the downgrade of the Portuguese debt 
presented in the first paragraph of this introduction, and the effects it had across the three countries 
identified, seems to suggest that European countries were, and still might be, vulnerable to third 
party’s credit downgrades.  
In order to better manage future international economic and financial shocks, and accordingly 
avoid consequences that are not inevitable, it is necessary to study how shocks were transmitted and 
the effects they produced in the past. Moreover, the study of the mechanisms of shock transmission 
might lead to a better analysis of systematic risk, which can increase the benefits of international 
portfolio diversification for investors, a benefit that will be visible in the economy. As previously 
stated, there is little literature concerning the spillover effects of credit ratings between developed 
nations. Ferreira and Gama (2007), Afonso et al. (2014) and Faias et al. (2012) seem to be the 
exceptions.  
                                                          
1
 Barron et al. (1997), Cornell et al. (1989), Ederington and Goh (1998), Glascock et al. (1987), Goh 
and Ederington (1993), Griffin and Sanvincente (1982), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hsueh 
and Liu (1992); Impson et al. (1992), Liu and Smith (1999), Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), Wansley 
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1.2.Research Questions 
With the purpose of understanding the effects of sovereign credit downgrades on both national 
and international stock markets this thesis will focus on downgrades by the two largest credit rating 
agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P), on countries from the most financially developed 
regions in the world (Europe, North America, East Asia and Oceania) in the period between 2009 
and 2015. More precisely, the main goal will be to answer the following questions:  
(1) How did credit downgrades affect national stock markets? 




This thesis is divided in six sections. In the present section, section 1, the topic of the thesis is 
introduced and its’ goals made clear. Section 2 begins with an introduction of the Credit Rating 
industry and the stylized facts related to this industry; it is followed by a review of existing 
literature regarding the impact of credit rating downgrades on national financial markets (stocks, 
bonds and currency); and concluded with the literature that concerns the spillover to foreign stock 
markets. In section 3 the Event-Study methodology is introduced and analyzed in detail, especially 
the test statistics that can be applied to such methodology. Section 4 concerns the data which will be 
used to answer the questions presented before, the selection process of such data is presented as 
well as a detailed analysis of the data. Section 5 will contain the results obtained by applying the 
methodology and the analysis of the same. Section 6 concludes and suggests some areas for further 
research. 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Credit Rating Agencies 
In 1909, John Moody published the first publicly available bond rating, focused on railroad 
companies’ bonds, a sector that had seen an immense increase in the default rates during the 1870s 
(Giesecke et al. (2011)). By 1913 his analysis had expanded into industrial and utilities’ related 
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Poor’s Publishing Company started issuing ratings, Standard Statistics Company followed in 1922 
and Fitch Publishing Company entered the market in 1924. 
The purpose of Moody’s analysis was to evaluate the borrower’s credit worthiness, that is, their 
ability to repay their debt. By doing this the agency decreased the information asymmetry between 
the lender and the borrower. This reduction allowed, and still does, for a better screening of the 
borrowers and hence a more appropriate use of available resources, that not only creates economic 
growth but decreases the likelihood of a financial crisis (Bernanke and Blinder (1992)).  To obtain 
this analysis investors would pay for it. However the industry changed in the 1970s, mainly due to 
two factors (White (2010)). Firstly the introduction of photocopy machines in everyday life made it 
impossible for credit rating agencies to continue operating their business model, as investors could 
buy one single manual an photocopy it among themselves. As such the companies switched from an 
“investor pay” based model to an “issuer pay” based model. This change has been controversial, as 
now issuers pay for ratings, an action that might distort the agencies’ incentives to criticize the 
issuer’s ability to repay. Secondly the bankruptcy of Penn-Central Railroad in 1970 shocked the 
market. This shock made both bond issuers and rating agencies aware of the importance of credit 
ratings (Fridson (1999)): issuers wanted to assure investors they would not default and rating 
agencies realized they were crucial for the market to operate properly. In fact, in 1999, New York 
Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote:  
“There are two superpowers in the world (…) there’s the United States and there’s Moody’s (…) 
it’s not clear who’s more powerful”. 
The impact of corporate downgrades on the firm’s debt and equity has been studied in depth, and 
two particular stylized facts have surged. On the one hand, credit rating upgrades appear to have no 
impact on either debt or equity, that is, there is no positive abnormal return associated with the 
firm’s equity or any abnormal negative impact on the firm’s debt yield2. On the other hand, credit 
rating downgrades appear to have a significant negative impact on both equity and debt, the former 
presents abnormal negative returns whereas the latter sees its’ yield increase abnormally2. 
                                                          
2
 Barron et al. (1997), Cornell et al. (1989), Ederington and Goh (1998), Glascock et al. (1987), Goh 
and Ederington (1993), Griffin and Sanvincente (1982), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hsueh 
and Liu (1992); Impson et al. (1992), Liu and Smith (1999), Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), Wansley 
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More recently, a third stylized fact has emerged: procyclicality. According to recent research 
credit ratings tend to follow economic cycles: upgrades occur more often in economic expansions 
whereas downgrades are more common in economic downturns (Cesaroni (2015), Bangia et al. 
(2002), Loffler (2004), Kiff et al. (2013), Valles (2006)). These authors claim that this happens 
because during periods of crisis the value of firms’ tends to decrease, increasing the relative size of 
debt, which makes it more difficult to repay. This new piece of evidence has created further 
discussion about the role of credit rating agencies in financial markets, as they might deepen the 
cycles instead of smoothing them, which might widen the impact on firm value. 
Despite the importance of ratings in capital markets and the non-disclosure of the rating 
determination methodology, several academic papers have, to some extent, successfully deduced 
how credit ratings are determined (Cantor and Packer (1994), Afonso (2003), Afonso et al. (2011)). 
Cantor and Packer (1994), one of the first attempts to replicate the models used by the agencies, 
were able to attain an R2 of 92% using just 7 economic variables to predict sovereign rating, 
whereas the most recent of these studies, Afonso et al. (2011) develops a model that accurately 
predicts the sovereign rating in over 75% of the cases. Furthermore model’s such as the Altman’s 
Z-Score can be used to predict the default probability of companies without resorting to rating 
agencies. Even though the models presented are not perfect substitutes of the models used by the 
credit rating agencies, they have significant predictive power. Accordingly some authors have 
challenged the premise that these agencies provide new information to the market. Partnoy (1999) 
argues that agencies have not only survived, but also thrived, not due to the content of their 
analysis, but because they have become a crucial element in financial regulations of developed 
countries. To back such argument he looks into SEC’s market regulations, central banks’ bond 
purchase regulations. Moreover he claims that the content of the agencies’ analysis has been 
increasingly void of statistical proof and increasingly filled with subjective analysis, which he 
proves by looking at how credit default swaps’ premiums float over time, even though the 
underlying credit rating does not change.  
If Partnoy (1999) is correct one should expect the Cumulative Abnormal Returns from the 
analysis to be close to zero sometime after the downgrade is announced since, according to the 
semi-strong Efficient Market Hypothesis proposed by Eugene Fama, new information would 
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2.2. National Impact 
As presented before the impact of credit downgrades at a firm level has been heavily studied. 
Nonetheless extensive research has been done on the impact of sovereign downgrades on national 
credit and stock markets. The studies presented below were all completed using the Event-Study 
methodology In the next chapter this methodology is thoroughly explained. 
Brooks et al. (2004) study the effect of credit rating changes by Moody’s, S&P, Fitch and 
Thompson on national stock markets between 1973 and 2000. In accordance with the previously 
presented stylized facts they find that upgrades have no impact on the stock markets while 
downgrades cause significant negative abnormal returns on the stock markets. Moreover, they find 
that different agencies have different power, S&P being the agency that most affects the stock 
market. Finally such effect is lasting, that is, new information is conveyed to the market, altering the 
value of the securities analyzed.  
Hooper et al. (2008) studies the impact of credit rating changes by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch on 
both the national stock market and the national currency for the period between 1995 and 2003. 
They find that both downgrades and upgrades affect significantly stock and foreign exchange 
markets, even though the strength of such impact is much higher in the case of downgrades. They 
conclude that an upgrade (downgrade) has a significant positive (negative) impact on stock markets 
that is also visible through lower (higher) stock volatility. Furthermore, in accordance with Brooks 
et al. (2004), they find that rating changes provide new information to the stock market, as the 
cumulative abnormal returns tend to persist over time. Nonetheless, the presence of abnormal 
returns prior to the announcement date seems to suggest that even though new information is 
provided to investors, they already expect it to some extent. Finally Hooper et al. (2008) finds no 
evidence that emerging economies are more exposed to rating changes than developed economies.  
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) study the impact of credit rating changes by S&P on both the 
national stock and bond markets during the 90s. They find that downgrades have significant impacts 
on both markets whereas upgrades only affect bond markets through a decrease in the companies’ 
yields. They also find that high inflation, large budget deficits and large sovereign debt increase the 
magnitude of the downgrade effects. They conclude that emerging economies are, therefore, more 
vulnerable to rating changes than developed economies. However, contagion effects across classes 
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liquidity. Hence, they determine that contagion effects across classes are more likely in developed 
economies rather than on emerging ones.  
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks (2008) use four different approaches to model stock returns 
in order to capture the impact of credit rating changes by S&P between 1975 and 2007. In two of 
these models, the quadratic market model and the higher order downside model, they find that both 
rating downgrades and upgrades have significant (negative and positive, respectively) impacts on 
national stock markets, even though the impact of downgrades is larger. Regarding the other two 
models used, the market model and the regular downside model, their results suggest that only 
downgrades impact (negatively) national stock markets.  
Mateev (2012) studies the impact of rating changes by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch on both bond 
and stock markets in Eastern European countries in the period between 1998 and 2007. The author 
finds that only rating downgrades affected significantly these markets, through higher yields and 
lower returns, respectively. Moreover the author finds that downgrades (upgrades) are more likely 
during economic recessions (expansions), a discovery in line with the rating procyclicality theory 
previously mentioned. 
With all this in mind one should therefore expect the national stock market of the downgraded 
country to suffer a significant decrease in value, even though there is room for mixed expectations 
regarding the duration of such decrease, as there have been contrary conclusions concerning the 
information given to the market (new vs already available). Such decrease will be amplified by the 
deep economic recession felt across parts of Europe during the period in question. In other words, in 
such context credit rating downgrades are only another factor depressing the stock markets. 
 
2.3. International Impact 
While the two previous impacts have been studied in detail (own firm and own country) the 
impact of rating changes of one country on another country has been somehow overlooked. Still, 
after the European sovereign debt crisis this issue has captured more interest among the academic 
community and more research has started to be developed on the topic.  
Using data ranging from 1989 to 2003 Ferreira and Gama (2007) study how credit rating changes 
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find that only downgrades create an impact strong enough to spillover to other countries’ stock 
market, since upgrades have no effect on national stock markets in the first place. Additionally, 
such impact is inversely related to the distance between countries, a conclusion in line with previous 
economic theories such as the Gravity Equation proposed by Jan Tinbergen, that asserts that 
countries that are geographically closer to each other will be more connected economically. They 
also conclude that emerging economies are in fact more exposed to spillovers (bigger stock crash), 
and that the larger the country being downgraded the more likely it is for the spillover effects to be 
felt in other countries. 
Afonso et al. (2014) investigates the connection between credit rating changes by S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch in one European country and financial markets’ volatility in other European countries. 
They split these countries in two groups: financially stable countries (UK, Germany, etc.) and 
financially unstable countries (Portugal, Greece, etc.) and use an event-study methodology to 
capture abnormal volatility. Such separation is crucial since their data ranges from 1995 to 2011, 
capturing the European sovereign debt crisis. They find that only downgrades in a country affect 
volatility in others, increasing volatility in both the bond and stock market. Such impact is enhanced 
when the downgrade concerns a financially unstable country. Taking into account the studies 
presented before, where downgrades are believed to have a negative impact on national stocks, 
bonds and even currency, one can infer that downgrades will reduce the prices of bonds and stocks 
in countries other than the ones being downgraded, a finding in line with Ferreira et al. (2007). 
Faias et al. (2012) studies the impact of credit downgrades by S&P not only on national stock 
markets but on other European stock markets for the period between 2008 and 2012. Using an 
event-study methodology they ascertain that both national and foreign stock markets significantly 
underperform, even though foreign stock markets’ underperformance is less pronounced when 
compared to the evolution observed in domestic markets. Afterwards, the abnormal returns 
registered in the foreign countries are regressed in a set of variables which includes a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if another country was downgraded. They find that such dummy variable is in 
fact significantly negative, meaning that there is evidence of spillover effects accross the European 
markets. 
Accordingly, it is expectable that the other countries’ stock markets also underperform, but in a 
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countries should help amplify those effects, since all countries are geographically close to each 
other. 
3. Event-Study Methodology 
In order to capture the effect of rating downgrades on the stock markets this thesis will adapt the 
methodology proposed by Mackinlay (1997), applying it to market indexes rather than to individual 
stocks. The following section explains the methodology proposed and my application. 
3.1.  Event Date 
The event date corresponds to the period in time where a certain action or announcement is made 
known to the market. In this thesis the event date will correspond to the date of the rating 
downgrade announcement by either Moody’s or S&P.  
3.2. Estimation Window 
In order to obtain the impact of the rating change on market returns one must first know what the 
returns would have been without that very impact. To do this we must model the index’s returns. In 
event-study related literature three types of models are widely used for stock analysis: the market 
model, factor models (such as the famous three Fama-French factors) and the constant mean return 
model. For the purpose of this thesis I will use the market model, since this was the model used in 
Mackinlay (1997), which, despite its simplicity, attained robust results. 
In the market model, stock returns’ sources are divided into 2 components: firm specific returns, 
captured by α, and market originated returns, captured by β, which comprises the stock’s 
responsiveness to market movements: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
As stated before, I will work with market indexes. As such, α will comprise the index’s 
individual movement, the part of the total return which cannot be explained by market movements, 
and β will capture the index’s response to market movements. Even though it seems somewhat 
redundant to check the market index’s response to movements in the market itself, it is easier to 
understand my idea if we consider the national market index as a portfolio composed only of 




 Page 16  
  
portfolio’s response to movements in the world market, which is affected by countless other 
international factors.  
It is important to mention that the model assumes that the error term ε has zero mean and 
constant variance. The failure of such assumption might lead to biased estimators. Nonetheless the 
widespread use of such model suggests that the failure of these assumptions is not a relevant issue. 
Accordingly the OLS estimation method will be used to obtain the parameters required. 
The estimation window comprises the period prior to the event date which is used to obtain the 
parameters required by the model chosen, in my case the market model’s Beta and Alpha. In my 
first approach I will use the daily stock returns from the 120 days prior to the beginning of the event 
window. On the one hand the use of daily data enables me to capture in a clearer way the impact of 
the rating change, as more infrequent data would be more likely to contain impacts from other 
sources (noise). On the other hand 120 days, approximately 6 trading months, enables me to capture 
the typical behavior of the stock, especially regarding its’ relationship with the global market. To 
check if results are robust to different time spans an additional second and third approach, with 
Estimation Windows of 60 and 20 days respectively, will be developed. Even though smaller time 
spans encompass a smaller estimation sample, they also encompass less noise. Accordingly it will 
be interesting to see which of these offsetting effects dominates the quality of the model. 
 
3.3. Event Window 
The event window corresponds to the time period where the effects of the event being studied 
are felt by the securities being analyzed. Even though the rating downgrade announcement occurs 
at, say, day t my event window will begin prior to it, at day t-15, as credit rating announcements are 
known in advance, which might lead to speculation that in turn might affect the returns of the stocks 
prior to the event date (Hooper at al. (2008)). The event window will contain, at first, the 3 trading 
weeks (15 trading days) prior and after the announcement, encompassing a total 30 day period. 
Once again, to check for result robustness, the event window on my second and third approaches 
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Having defined the estimation window, the event date and the event window a figure can be 





In the primary case T0 begins 120 days prior to T1. This period corresponds to the estimation 
window which will be used to obtain the market model’s parameters. From T1 to T2, the period 
comprising the 30 day event window in this case, the abnormal returns will be calculated. Even 
though Mackinlay (1997) proposes a third window, the Post-Event Window, to increase the 
robustness of the parameters estimated, it will not be used for the purpose of this thesis, as most of 
the research conducted using this methodology obtains robust estimators using the Estimation 
Window alone. 
 
3.4. Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal return corresponds to the part of the actual stock return which cannot be explained 
by the model used. In other words it is the difference between the actual return and the expected 
one: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 
Under the hypothesis that the event has no effect on the returns then the abnormal returns follow 
a normal distribution: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 ) 
The abnormal return’s variance can be defined as: 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
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As it is visible above, the variance can be divided into two parts. The first component comes 
from the variance of the market model residuals, ε, while the second component stems from the 
measurement error when obtaining the Beta and Alpha parameters for the market model. The 
parameters µm and σm refer to the market’s sample average and variance, respectively. Mackinlay 
(1997) argues that if the estimation window (T1-T0) is large enough the measurement error 
component can be ignored. Assuming the estimation windows of 120, 60 and 20 days are large 




To make result analysis simpler it is usual to aggregate abnormal returns into average abnormal 
returns. In our case this average will simply be the average of the abnormal returns of the different 
indexes of the sample in the same period in time, that is: 




After calculating the average abnormal returns Mackinlay (1997) suggests calculating the 
cumulative average abnormal returns. Such returns are the cumulative average of the previously 






































As such under the null hypothesis that there is no impact, that is, the sovereign credit rating 






Regarding the cumulative average abnormal returns the average and variance is: 








Accordingly under the null hypothesis that there is no impact the test statistic Z follows, once 





In conclusion, the methodology proposed in this section will allow me to identify abnormal 













4.1. Countries and Indexes 
As previously stated, for this thesis will focus on downgrades affecting countries from the most 
economically advanced regions of the planet: Europe (which I will divide in Northern, Western, 
Southern and Great Britain), North America, South America and Eastern Asia. Each of these 
regions will encompass a series of developed countries for analysis (see Table 1 in the appendix). 
The criteria for a country to be considered as a neighbor country was, obviously, geographic 
location. This translated into a common frontier or proximity among islands. When in doubt about 
the closeness of two countries (e.g. Finland and Denmark), if the non-downgraded country was 
among the top 5 trade partners (measured by the sum of both imports and exports) of the 
downgraded country, it was included in the sample. 
From each of the countries present in the previously mentioned Table 1 there will be a market 
index associated. As some of the countries selected have more than 1 relevant stock index (e.g. US 
or UK) I will choose the one which most resembles a market index, the one which comprises the 
highest number and most industry diverse stocks (see Table 2 in the appendix). 
Regarding the content of the tables some considerations must be made. First and foremost it is 
important to explain why Taiwan was included while Hong Kong was discarded from the sample. 
Whereas Taiwan has some independence from China, which translates into local companies only 
being traded on the local stock exchange, Hong Kong has a different political system. In the Hong 
Kong stock exchange Chinese companies represent the bulk of the listed companies, furthermore 
most local companies are also traded on the Shanghai stock exchange. As such to have both Hong 
Kong and China would simply be data repetition. Secondly, even though 9 of the 22 countries 
included in the sample weren´t downgraded during the period in question, 2009 to 2015, they will 
still be kept in the sample in order to study the impact the downgrades of their neighbor countries 
had on their own markets.  
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4.2. Market Index 
Faias et al. (2012) use the market model to predict stocks’ returns. They do so using two separate 
market indexes: the S&P500 and the MSCI World. The authors state that the abnormal returns don’t 
differ significantly, as the choice of the market index affected only the regression of the abnormal 
returns on an explanatory set of variables that contains the downgrade dummy variable. However, 
such regression will not be performed, which renders the choice between these two indexes 
insignificant. 
They also point out that the use of regional indexes, such as the MSCI Europe index in the case 
of Europe, would reduce the abnormal returns verified in that region, as some of the index’s 
constituents belong to the countries being analyzed. It is easier to see why abnormal returns are 
reduced if one takes the case to the extreme where the weight of national stocks on the regional 
portfolio is 1: the regional portfolio becomes a national portfolio, and hence, should have a much 
higher correlation, close to 1, with the originally national portfolio, diminishing the room for 
abnormal returns as both portfolios move together, since external factors (like credit downgrades) 
have an equal impact on both portfolios. With this in mind the MSCI World and the FTSE Global 
were chosen to check if my results were robust to different benchmarks. A simple analysis of both 
indexes suggests that such choice will provide a significant robustness check (see Table 4). 
As one can infer from table 4, the distribution of both indexes’ daily returns is almost identical: 
both indexes have a mean of 0,04% and their standard deviations differ only by 0,01%. 
Nonetheless, they do not tend to move together. In other words, even though both indexes move on 
the same direction (if one has positive returns the other will tend to present positive returns as well) 
they do not move in equal proportions, as the correlation is below 1. This partial correlation can be 
explained by the number and diversity of the indexes’ constituents, as the FTSE encompasses 6 
times more securities from twice the number of countries represented on the MSCI. As one can see 
in Table 5, the scale of diversification of the FTSE yields much smaller Betas than the MSCI. As 
previously explained as the diversification of securities increases, the effect of the market index on 
the national index decreases, since the weight of national securities becomes less and less 
significant. Once again the returns were calculating using end of day quotes from the Eikon Reuters 
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4.3.Time period 
For the purpose of this thesis I will focus on the time period between 2009 and 2015. Such 
period will present recent data while encompassing periods of high uncertainty, mainly due to the 
2008 financial crisis. This aspect will be especially visible in the case of Europe, where the 
European Sovereign Debt crisis was in full force. If, on the one hand, the increased sensitivity of 
investors will translate in more volatile markets, which should turn the abnormal returns more 
visible, on the other, regions like North America might have been seen as a safe haven, which 
should diminish the impact felt on these regions. 
 
4.4. Credit Rating Agencies 
As written before this thesis focuses on the ratings provided by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. 
The choice stems from the market share of these two rating agencies, an indicator of their power on 
the market. According to the SEC Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (2012) S&P and Moody’s rated 83,1% of all securities issued the year before, the 
number goes up to 88,3% if one regards governmental securities issued that year alone (see figures 
1 and 2). These percentages suggest that financial markets value the ratings of these agencies 
significantly above the ratings of other agencies. Accordingly rating changes made by these 
companies should have the greatest impact on the stocks selected. 
 
4.5. Announcement Dates 
Table 3 in the appendix presents the dates of credit rating announcements by both S&P and 
Moody’s. The dates were retrieved from the economic platform Trading Economics. In countries 
with more than 1 downgrade available, a single date was randomly selected. If the date selected 
coincided with the downgrade date of a neighbor country, or was part of the event’s estimation 
window, the process was repeated. By doing so the noise in the estimation window can be 
minimized, bringing more stability to the model forecasted, which in turn will provide a more 
accurate estimate of the abnormal returns. Accordingly I will have 15 downgrade dates, 1 per 
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As one can infer from Table 4 there are 15 Event Dates, spread between December 2009 and 
August 2015. Even though one would like to have more event dates the fact that this thesis focus on 
developed regions shortens the array of possibilities, as advanced countries possess a credit 
worthiness that is strong enough to prevent negative shocks, such as the financial crisis, to 
transform into rating downgrades. These dates were selected randomly, when possible. as most 
countries selected only suffered a single downgrade during this period (e.g. US or Finland), 
suffering more from changes in rating outlooks (future expectations of rating behavior) rather than 
ratings themselves. Furthermore an increase in the time span would not necessarily yield more 
downgrades, as some of the countries in the sample were downgraded only once in history, a 
moment already encompassed in the sample. As each downgraded country has, at least, 1 neighbor 
country, the number of events is larger for this group, (32 vs 15).  
 
 
5. Result Analysis 
5.1. 120 day Estimation Window 
When using the MSCI World index as a market index there is a strange pattern in the trajectory 
of the cumulative abnormal returns for both the downgraded and the neighbor countries (Figure 3): 
they appear somewhat constant until day 5 after the downgrade, around 1%, increasing afterwards. 
Furthermore no single abnormal return is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, for 
neither the downgraded nor the neighbor country.  
Looking into the case where the FTSE Global was used as the market index (Figure 6), a pattern 
more in line with previous empirical evidence can be identified: both the downgraded country and 
the neighbor present a steep upward trajectory which is reversed in the 2 weeks prior to the event, 
due to persistent negative abnormal returns in that period, but the positive abnormal returns after the 
event change the trajectory back to the initial path. Nonetheless no single abnormal return was 
significant, once again, which makes it very difficult to conclude anything regarding the impact of 
downgrades. One could test if the abnormal returns of the downgraded country and the neighbor 
countries are different via a t-test, however, different time spans provided (robust) results that 
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5.2. 60 day Estimation Window  
When using a 60 day estimation window better results were obtained, especially in the case of 
the FTSE (Figure 7). By using the FTSE index there is an obvious downward trend on the 
cumulative abnormal returns prior to the event, in both downgraded and neighbor countries. As 
expected the downgraded countries suffer a stronger impact from the downgrade, -1% cumulative 
abnormal return at the event date, and don’t return to normality after it, as they maintain negative 
cumulative abnormal returns in 10 days after the event. In the case of the neighbor countries, which 
present a -0,7% cumulative abnormal return at the event date, the trend is reversed after the 
downgrade and they return to normality, 0% cumulative abnormal returns, approximately after 10 
days. Even though there is no significant abnormal return in the case of the downgraded countries, 
the neighbor countries present significant abnormal returns in several days, at a 95% confidence 
level, namely the event date. 
The MSCI Index presented, once again, less expected results (Figure 4). Even though there is a 
milder trend reversion around 5 days after the event, for both downgraded and neighbor countries, it 
is much milder than in the case of the FTSE Index. Furthermore, the magnitude of the downgrade 
impact is larger in the national country, which hits its lowest level around -0,5% 6 days after the 
event. Moreover only the abnormal return at (t0 + 3) in the neighbor countries is statistically 
significant at a 95% confidence level.  
 
5.3. 20 day Estimation Window 
To further reduce any noise that might exist in the estimation window I reduced it to 20 days, 
approximately one trading month, prior to the beginning of the event window. The event window 
was also reduced to 5 days, around one trading week, to further increase the accuracy of the 
significance tests. By doing so I obtained results which are even more aligned with previous 
empirical evidence, for both the MSCI and the FTSE indexes. 
Regarding the FTSE, the negative trend in cumulative abnormal returns is present for both the 
downgraded and the neighbor countries (Figure 8). For the neighbor countries the lowest point is 
attained at (t0 + 1), around -1%, and normality is attained 5 days after the event date (0% CAR). 
This group of countries presents several significant negative abnormal returns, at a 95% confidence 
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trajectory. Their lowest point is attained at (t0 + 1), around -2,5%, but they don’t return to 
normality, as the CAR is persistently negative around -2%. 
A change in the benchmark index, to the MSCI, changes the trajectory (Figure 5). According to 
the results attained the negative trend is never reversed. In the case of the neighbor countries the 
lowest CAR (-0,6%) occurs at (t0 + 3) and is mildly reversed in the following days. The neighbor 
countries on the other hand experience their lowest CAR (-1,9%) at the end of the event window. 
However the only significant abnormal return is verified in the neighbor countries at (t0 + 3).   
 
5.4. Remarks 
Some remarks must be given regarding the results attained, especially on: the fact that the MSCI 
performed consistently poorer than the FTSE; the fact that reduced estimation and event windows 
performed better than longer ones; the fact that in all windows and benchmarks the downgraded 
countries presented either positive or no abnormal returns at all on the event date. 
Looking more carefully into the MSCI World index one can observe it is significantly less 
diversified than the FTSE Global, which might be affecting the results. As the index has less 
constituents (6 times fewer constituents than the FTSE), from less countries of origin (half of the 
countries of the FTSE, and a bigger focus on Europe and the US), the relative weight of the stocks 
from the countries in the sample might be diluting the abnormal returns. This happens because the 
market index drops approximately in the same proportion as the country index, instead of keeping 
itself insulated from the event, enabling to see its impact. In fact 75% of the constituents of the 
index are companies from the US, UK and Japan, all of them countries represented in the sample 
both as downgraded countries and neighbor countries. By contrast the truly global reach of the 
FTSE might act as a barrier between the impact of the national index and the impact on the global 
index. 
According to Mackinlay (1997) there is a trade-off between model accuracy and model stability 
when considering the length of the estimation window. If on one hand an increased time period can 
lead to a better model, due to a higher number of observations, the likelihood of encountering noise 
also increases, decreasing the quality of the model. As the only type of noise controlled for was 
downgrades in neighbor countries, events like government deficit/superavit announcements 
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(such as the ones in Brazil due to the corruption scandal Lava Jato) or, more recently, geopolitical 
actions of high importance (like the Brexit) might be affecting the accuracy of the model, as the 
national index moves independently from the market portfolio, hence implying a Beta close to 0.  
Finally, and perhaps the most striking result, we must analyze why the negative abnormal 
returns were only found in neighbor countries. By dividing the sample in continents we observe that 
Europe presents a negative, yet insignificant, abnormal return for the 20 and 60 days estimation 
windows using both benchmarks (see Table 7); America, both North and South, Asia and Oceania 
all present positive, however insignificant, abnormal returns for all windows and benchmarks. 
Having narrowed the question to Europe we can wonder what makes the old continent different 
from the others. As all data refers to the period after the 2008 financial crisis it overlaps with the 
European debt crisis. During this period the sustainability of several national debts was questioned, 
leading some countries to either default, such as Greece, or asking for financial support, like 
Portugal and Ireland. This support was fundamentally based on austerity measures, hence 
decreasing national GDP and more importantly for this thesis, Investment, both national and 
foreign, in the short run. Thus one possible explanation for the abnormal returns verified only in 
Europe might be the fear of GDP and Investment contraction caused by austerity, which was 
brought upon by the unsustainable level of national debt, increased by the larger yields implied by 
lower credit ratings. The uncertain environment during this period, and consequent flight to safety 
from European investors to non-European stock markets, might have offset the impact of 
downgrades in these countries, hence canceling possible abnormal returns. One way to assess if this 
hypothesis is correct is to look into government bond yields for the period analyzed. If there was in 
fact a flight to safety in the stock market, a parallel one should have occurred in the bond market, as 
investors typically hold different asset classes in their portfolios. This movement, along with the 
lower risk premium investors require for holding (what they perceive as) safer assets, would have 
brought yields down for non-European bonds, while increasing the yields of European bonds. By 
looking into historical yield to maturities on 10 year government bonds, one can observe that the 
yield to maturity of Japanese and American bonds decreased constantly from approximately 1,4% 
and 4% in 2009, to approximately 0,25% and 2,25% in 2015. In Europe some countries did follow 
this trend (e.g. France and Germany), however, countries like Ireland, Portugal and Spain saw the 
yields to maturity of their respective bonds increase until early 2013, reaching values well above 
10% in the case of Ireland. As such there is some evidence of a flight to safety in the bond market. 
If a parallel movement occurred in the stock market, it might explain the different reactions to the 
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European countries, as countries like the US or Japan were downgraded from AAA to AA+, unlike 
some of the European countries like Ireland, Portugal or Spain, which were downgraded from 
Investment grade to Speculative grade. Nonetheless, this flight to safety argument does not explain 
why neighbor countries feel the impact of the safe economy’s rating downgrade (e.g. Canada 
suffering a market crash due to USA’s rating downgrade). If there is no impact on the downgraded 
country, there should be no contagion effect to be spread to neighbor economies. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This thesis aimed to explore the impact of downgrades on national stock markets and the 
spillover effect to neighboring countries. Through an event-study analysis, and consistent with 
previous theory, I found that downgrades not only influence national stock markets but also leak to 
their neighbors, with a milder influence. 
Regarding the impact at the event date on a national level the analysis suggests that rating 
downgrades only affect negatively the stock markets in Europe. At a global level there are 
insignificant positive abnormal returns. As discussed before the safe haven perspective might 
explain, to some extent, this result. Concerning the spillover effect all models used suggest there are 
in fact spillover effects at the event date.  
Such discoveries should be taken into account in portfolio allocation and can also be the basis of 
event-driven profit strategies. Regarding portfolio allocation, this thesis highlights how 
diversification benefits across neighbor countries might be overstated. Such overstatement can be 
perceived as latent correlation: on regular times the diversification benefits might exist, however, in 
troubled times, leading to credit downgrades, they diminish significantly, as both markets will react 
adversely to such event. Concerning event-driven strategies, this thesis suggests that shorting 
market indexes both in both downgraded and neighbor countries can lead to potential profits. 
Moreover, going long on sell options, puts, on national and foreign indexes might be an additional 
method to realize profits. 
I found that the choice of benchmark has a big repercussion on the results, especially the power 
of the tests, and therefore the conclusions one can take. The fact that American, British and 
Japanese stocks compose around 75% of the MSCI World has a significant impact on the (lack of) 
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This thesis is also in line with Makinlay (1997) in respect to both the estimation and the event 
window length. According to the results there is in fact a trade-off between model accuracy, 
increasing with bigger estimation windows, and stability, decreasing with bigger estimation 
windows, due to the noise included, which is very significant at a macroeconomic level. Regarding 
the event window the results also suggest that shorter windows present more accurate results, which 
translate in more significant abnormal returns. 
Further research could be done on 2 topics. First, one could assess separately the impact of the 
several types of downgrades. Different impacts for different downgrades, (e.g. AAA to AA vs BBB 
to BB), would certainly help explain the diverse results attained for Europe. Second, one could 
investigate the size, as the preliminary evidence of section 5.4 suggests, of the migration of 
investment funds from Europe to other regions after the outburst of the sovereign debt crisis. If my 
theory is correct one should verify a significant movement of capital from Europe to these 
economically developed regions. The fact that there are no abnormal returns on downgrade dates 
for non-European countries could be reflecting the fact that even though such countries’ credit 
worthiness was deteriorating, they were seen as a safe haven compared to the rest of the world. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Countries present in the sample 
Table 1 presents the countries present in the sample. Countries marked with an asterisk were downgraded during the 
sample period. 
 
Table 2: Indexes present in the sample 
Table 2 presents the indexes selected per country. They follow the order of Table 1 presented above. Indexes 
marked with an asterisk were downgraded during the sample period. 
 
Table 3: Event dates per country 
Table 3 presents the downgrade dates for each country in the sample. They follow the order of Table 1 presented 












Northern Europe Western Europe Southern Europe Great Britain North America South America Eastern Asia Oceania
Denmark Belgium* Italy* Ireland* Canada Argentina* China Australia
Finland* France* Portugal* United Kingdom* Mexico* Brazil* Japan New Zealand*
Norway Germany Spain* USA* Chile South Korea*
Sweden Netherlands* Taiwan
Northern Europe Western Europe Southern Europe Great Britain North America South America Eastern Asia Oceania
OMXC BEL20* FTSEMIB* ISEQ* TSX MERV* SSEC ASX200
OMXH* CAC40* PSI20* FTSE350* IPC* BVSP* JPX NZ50*
OBX DAX IBEX35* SP500* IPSA KS200*
OMX AEX* TWII
Northern Europe Western Europe Southern Europe Great Britain North America South America Eastern Asia Oceania
N/A 16-12-2011 13-07-2012 17-12-2010 N/A 17-06-2014 N/A N/A
10-10-2014* 08-11-2013* 15-03-2011 22-02-2013 14-12-2009* 11-08-2015* 27-01-2011* 29-09-2011*
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the MSCI World and the FTSE Global returns 







Mean      0,04% 0,04% 
Standard Deviation 1,00% 0,99% 
Correlation 41% 
 
Table 5: Average Betas of the MSCI World and the FTSE Global 
Table 5 presents the average Betas attained using the Market Model using the MSCI World and the FTSE Global, 
for the different estimation windows and groups of countries. 
  Downgraded Neighbor 
MSCI 20d 0,8800 0,8664 
MSCI 60d 0,8776 0,8921 
MSCI 120d 0,7861 0,7746 
FTSE 20d 0,0909 0,1152 
FTSE 60d 0,1616 0,1604 
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Table 6: AAR for downgraded countries from the Event-Study analysis 
Table 6 presents the average abnormal returns obtained through the Event-Study analysis of downgraded countries 
for both market indexes and the several estimation and event windows considered. AARs marked with an asterisk are 
significant at a 95% level.  
  MSCI FTSE 
  120d 60d 20d 120d 60d 20d 
-15 0,46%*     0,38%*     
-14 0,38%     0,18%     
-13 -0,19%     -0,04%     
-12 -0,32%     0,21%     
-11 0,24%     0,34%     
-10 0,38%* 0,37%*   0,89%* 0,90%*   
-9 0,42%* 0,42%*   0,40% 0,44%   
-8 0,07% -0,09%   0,27% 0,24%   
-7 -0,07% -0,06%   -0,18% -0,19%   
-6 0,01% -0,05%   -0,32% -0,45%   
-5 -0,10% -0,17% -0,23% -0,10% -0,23% -0,34% 
-4 -0,14% -0,19% -0,28% -0,14% -0,24% -0,35% 
-3 0,26% 0,19% 0,00% -0,05% -0,05% -0,10% 
-2 -0,07% -0,02% -0,05% -0,25% -0,23% -0,11% 
-1 -0,60% -0,71% -0,82% -1,09% -1,24% -1,33% 
0 0,33% 0,29% 0,17% 0,23% 0,12% 0,12% 
1 0,28% 0,27% 0,17% -0,23% -0,25% -0,26% 
2 -0,52% -0,59% -0,65% 0,16% 0,07% 0,02% 
3 0,15% 0,12% 0,00% 0,14% 0,22% 0,15% 
4 0,27% 0,04% -0,01% 0,70% 0,51% 0,58% 
5 -0,17% -0,11% -0,16% -0,12% -0,04% -0,08% 
6 -0,14% -0,21%   -0,27% -0,29%   
7 0,15% 0,26%   -0,04% 0,04%   
8 0,17% 0,10%   -0,03% -0,06%   
9 0,30% 0,08%   0,10% 0,00%   
10 -0,01% 0,04%   0,10% 0,08%   
11 0,11%     0,46%     
12 0,14%     0,25%     
13 0,17%     0,39%     
14 0,26%     -0,04%     
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Table 7: AAR for neighbor countries from the Event-Study analysis 
Table 7 presents the average abnormal returns obtained through the Event-Study analysis of neighbor countries for 
both market indexes and the several estimation and event windows considered. AARs marked with an asterisk are 
significant at a 95% level. 
  MSCI FTSE 
  120d 60d 20d 120d 60d 20d 
-15 0,37%*     0,26%     
-14 0,06%     0,11%     
-13 -0,29%     -0,33%*     
-12 -0,26%     0,36%     
-11 -0,09%     -0,05%     
-10 0,28%* 0,25%   0,68%* 0,66%*   
-9 0,53%* 0,49%*   0,62%* 0,63%*   
-8 -0,09% -0,30%   -0,01% -0,03%   
-7 -0,24% -0,24%   -0,29% -0,32%   
-6 -0,24% -0,14%   -0,67%* -0,71%*   
-5 0,03% 0,08% 0,12% 0,10% 0,07% 0,05% 
-4 -0,23% -0,24% -0,29% -0,33% -0,37% -0,36% 
-3 0,38% 0,25% 0,14% 0,04% 0,00% -0,01% 
-2 -0,13% -0,08% -0,07% -0,27% -0,26% -0,13% 
-1 0,36%* 0,28% 0,14% 0,03% -0,03%* -0,08%* 
0 -0,07% 0,00% -0,06% -0,30% -0,38% -0,32% 
1 0,25% 0,25% 0,16% -0,27% -0,29% -0,27% 
2 0,06% -0,07% -0,07% 0,68%* 0,64%* 0,70%* 
3 -0,40%* -0,59%* -0,68%* -0,50%* -0,50%* -0,44%* 
4 0,11% 0,00% 0,02% 0,55% 0,50% 0,59%* 
5 -0,06% -0,05% 0,02% 0,15% 0,16% 0,22% 
6 0,16% 0,10%   0,05% 0,07%   
7 -0,01% 0,04%   -0,22% -0,26%   
8 -0,01% -0,07%   -0,20% -0,28%   
9 0,47%* 0,38%*   0,46% 0,45%   
10 0,21% 0,22%   0,41% 0,37%   
11 -0,03%     0,41%     
12 -0,05%     0,01%     
13 0,21%     0,30%     
14 0,23%     -0,03%     
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Table 8: AAR for downgraded countries in Europe 
Table 8 presents the abnormal average returns for European countries alone. Note that at the event date the 60 and 20 
days estimation windows columns present negative abnormal returns. AARs marked with an asterisk are significant at a 
95% level. 
  MSCI FTSE 
  120d 60d 20d 120d 60d 20d 
-15 0,71%*     0,68%*     
-14 0,32%     0,19%     
-13 -0,15%     -0,18%     
-12 -0,11%     0,69%     
-11 0,44%     0,50%     
-10 0,45% 0,41%   1,22% 1,22%   
-9 0,68%* 0,68%*   0,71%* 0,77%*   
-8 0,02% -0,21%   0,41% 0,36%   
-7 -0,25% -0,23%   -0,46% -0,45%   
-6 -0,59% -0,65%   -0,97%* -1,17%*   
-5 0,05% -0,03% -0,13% 0,12% -0,09% -0,21% 
-4 0,16% 0,08% -0,08% -0,03% -0,16% -0,24% 
-3 0,60% 0,49% 0,19% 0,36% 0,36% 0,29% 
-2 -0,13% -0,04% -0,06% -0,34% -0,30% -0,16% 
-1 0,30% 0,11% -0,05% -0,11% -0,33% -0,53% 
0 0,01% -0,03% -0,21% 0,02% -0,14% -0,20% 
1 0,42%* 0,48%* 0,33% 0,18% 0,18% 0,10% 
2 -0,14% -0,25% -0,34% 0,47% 0,40% 0,27% 
3 -0,51% -0,56%* -0,74%* -0,40% -0,27% -0,27% 
4 0,31% -0,10% -0,19% 0,77%* 0,45% 0,50% 
5 -0,27% -0,14% -0,22% -0,20% -0,09% -0,09% 
6 -0,26% -0,36%   -0,47% -0,49%   
7 0,07% 0,30%   -0,04% 0,10%   
8 0,24% 0,19%   0,24% 0,21%   
9 0,61% 0,38%   1,07% 0,92%   
10 -0,12% -0,01%   0,17% 0,23%   
11 0,03%     0,33%     
12 -0,08%     -0,21%     
13 0,48%     0,54%     
14 0,17%     0,15%     







 Page 34  
  
Figure 1: Ratings of Government Securities for the year of 2012 
Figure 1 presents the percentage of Government Securities rated by S&P, Moody´s and other rating agencies in 2012. 
 
Figure 2: Ratings for the year of 2012 
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Figure 3: CAARs for the MSCI World index using a 120 day Estimation Window 
Figure 3 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns obtained using the MSCI index using a 120 day estimation 
window for both downgraded and neighbor countries. 
 
Figure 4: CAARs for the MSCI World index using a 60 day Estimation Window 
Figure 4 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns obtained using the MSCI index using a 60 day estimation 
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Figure 5: CAARs for the MSCI World index using a 20 day Estimation Window 
Figure 5 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns obtained using the MSCI index using a 20 day estimation 
window for both downgraded and neighbor countries. 
 
Figure 6: CAARs for the FTSE Global index using a 120 day Estimation Window 
Figure 6 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns obtained using the FTSE index using a 120 day estimation 
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Figure 7: CAARs for the FTSE Global index using a 60 day Estimation Window 
Figure 7 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns obtained using the FTSE index using a 60 day estimation 
window for both downgraded and neighbor countries. 
 
Figure 8: CAARs for the FTSE Global index using a 20 day Estimation Window 
Figure 8 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns obtained using the FTSE index using a 20 day estimation 
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